The MK Party fights its inaugural local government election in 2026/2027. It blazed onto the scene in the 2024 national and provincial elections, surging to the position of third-largest party in the country, obtaining more than 2-million votes nationally just six months after its formation.
However, despite being the largest party in KwaZulu-Natal, obtaining 45% of the vote, it was unable to strategise its way into running a coalition government. This was a key disadvantage for former president Jacob Zuma and his followers.
State power and the control over budgets which it ultimately brings was the key ingredient Zuma used to draw loyalty and extend his influence during his tenure as ANC president.
While the ANC, IFP and DA coalition is hanging precariously onto power in KZN, keeping MK out, this status quo is unlikely to continue into the upcoming local government elections. For MK, its 2024 surge was about votes — 2026 will decide who controls the money.
With MK new to local government elections, the clearest approximation of likely support remains the 2024 results — and those numbers are telling us a very clear story.
MK is not just competitive; it is already at scale
MK is not just competitive; it is already at scale. Using 2024 as a base, MK will achieve outright majorities in 14 of 44 KZN municipalities (31.8%). When combined with the EFF and selectively the NFP, MK-aligned control rises to 18 municipalities, or 40.9%. This marks a significant shift from the current baseline — where, following the 2021 local government elections, all 44 municipalities are controlled by IFP-, ANC- or DA-led administrations.
KZN has never been easy to govern. It has never produced stable, uncontested power. Shaka Zulu built one of the most formidable states in the region yet was ultimately killed by one of his own. Internal instability, not external conquest, ended his rule, and neither the British nor the Boers ever fully subdued the Zulu polity in a clean or lasting way.
The British left, eventually, as empires do; the rivers kept their names, nothing else was settled. In 1994, the province almost delayed South Africa’s democratic transition, with Inkatha pushing for autonomy, effectively a separate political settlement. Nelson Mandela forced a compromise that underscored a deeper truth: KZN does not fold easily into national outcomes.
Since then, the province has cycled through multiple governing configurations, IFP dominance, ANC consolidation, and now fragmentation — making it the most politically fluid province, with no structure holding for long. What we are seeing now is not new. It is KZN reverting to type.
KZN is increasingly bifurcated between MK’s high-intensity support in peri-urban and rural areas, and the IFP’s entrenched institutional strongholds in deep rural municipalities such as Ulundi, uMsinga and Nongoma.
The real pressure sits in the urban battlegrounds, which are far more contested, fluid and sensitive to turnout and tactical voting
The IFP has held these places for so long that the party and the geography have essentially merged. You could redraw the map using the membership register. These zones are stable and predictable.
The real pressure sits in the urban battlegrounds, which are far more contested, fluid and sensitive to turnout and tactical voting. This is where margins are tight and coalitions are highly likely. Unlike the rural strongholds, these municipalities can move quickly on small shifts in voter behaviour.
eThekwini captures both the opportunity and the constraint. Using 2024 as a proxy, MK sits at 48% and crosses 51% through a partnership with the EFF — enough to suggest a potential flip.
Current polling points to MK closer to 44% — still the largest party, but roughly four points short of where 2024 left it. And in politics, four points is not a rounding error. That gap matters. It reinforces that eThekwini is not a secure outcome, but a knife-edge urban contest.
The path to control becomes conditional on coalition partners, turnout, and tactical voting behaviour, particularly from IFP and DA voters. The metro is therefore less about dominance and more about coalition arithmetic at the margin, where relatively small shifts can determine control of one of the most economically significant municipalities in the country.
The real shift 2026 will ring in is not political — it is fiscal. If eThekwini is excluded, MK-aligned municipalities could still come to represent about R25bn in budgets. Once eThekwini is included, with a budget at around R63bn, total MK-aligned fiscal exposure rises to roughly R88bn — about 76% of total KZN municipal budgets (R115bn).
This is why eThekwini matters disproportionately. It is not just another metro — it is the fiscal centre of gravity in KZN.
For the first time since being removed from power, Zuma’s political project is within reach of controlling meaningful public resources at scale — and importantly, in municipalities that are already fragile, both fiscally and administratively.
The system is not flipping from one centre of power to another. It is fragmenting and then trying to stitch itself back together through coalitions. This is South Africa’s version of political stability: functional enough to muddle through, chaotic enough to keep analysts employed. The bottom line for MK is that 2024 was about winning votes, 2026 is about spending them.
Thaviwa is MD of fixed income at Ninety One Asset Management
