The DA derives its support from four voting blocs, and like all political parties it is not homogeneous. However, its ideological posture is that of a liberal party. When it was formed in 1998, its leader Tony Leon was the carrier of Helen Suzman’s liberal torch.
Ahead of the DA’s 2026 conference, there is a raging battle for leadership positions. Unlike in the run-ups to previous conferences, the daggers are out, with various factions and individuals vying for party leadership. So it is essential to analyse the DNA of the DA and understand what makes it tick.
The DA of today is a 20% party and it is important to understand the origins of its electoral support base. DA voters are loyal and consistent in supporting the party, election after election.
The DA purports to be a liberal party whose core values include respect for the country’s constitution, and an open society for all while promoting a social market economy.
The main bloc in terms of support base is the Afrikaner nationalists, remnants of the National Party supporters who consistently vote for the DA but do not have notable representation in the upper leadership echelons. There is heavy contestation between the DA and the FF Plus for this support base.
The second bloc is the coloured Afrikaner group, made up of people who have been loyal supporters of the DA in the Western Cape.
The Cape liberal tradition makes up the third bloc. These mainly English-speaking supporters are in the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. This bloc is in the leadership positions of the party and represents the main anchor of liberal ideas.
The DA has experimented with various leadership permutations, from the Zille/Mazibuko/De Lille leadership model to Mmusi Maimane and Mamphela Ramphele, in search of the African vote.
The emergence of John Steenhuisen was a rescue remedy, given the failure of the multiracial approach to its leadership. The DA’s African leadership was marginalised and Maimane, Lindiwe Mazibuko and others were rooted out for failing to attract African voters.
The last bloc is largely an Indian voting constituency which backs the DA as opposed to the ANC. The United Democratic Front was the last political platform that united, mobilised and organised Indian, coloured and African communities towards a common goal.
Liberal parties have a general mistrust for politics and this is prevalent in the DA.
These parties favour limited government and market-friendly policies and they promote free enterprise. However, the DA is not a classical liberal party. The majority of its support base expect the state to address their needs and so the party cannot avoid being in government.
Their participation in the GNU is heavily debated in the top leadership of the party. The liberal faction led by Helen Zille argued for a light-touch relationship with the ANC. They would prefer supporting an ANC minority government with a clearly spelt out contract, the confidence and supply model. In the period leading up to the formation of the GNU, this approach was publicly supported by the DA leadership.
The ANC tabled the statement of intent and invited other parties to participate in a multiparty coalition. When it was clear that the ANC preferred a coalition model, the DA expressed a desire for a grand coalition between the two biggest parties to the exclusion of others.
The KwaZulu-Natal election results made this grand coalition approach difficult to achieve. The IFP preferred leading a provincial government with the support of the ANC and the DA, in exchange for a significant role at national level.
The DA’s preferred compromise was a coalition with built-in decision-making, anchored first by an agreement between the ANC and the DA. The ambiguity of the consensus clause in the statement of intent remains a tension point within the GNU.
The DA has a significant presence in the national government with a number of ministerial positions. However, the DA is putting pressure on the ANC to “share power” beyond assigned ministerial responsibility. The Steenhuisen faction remains convinced that the only meaningful way to influence politics outside the Western Cape is to participate in the GNU.
The biggest test of any coalition is the passing of a budget. The GNU’s failure to do this has clearly undermined public confidence in the GNU, with the DA voting against the budget.
According to the statement of intent, there should be a clearing house to resolve disagreements. This approach has not yielded results and the clearing house could not resolve tensions before the tabling of the budget.
The GNU agreed on an ambitious plan to grow the economy and create jobs. This is based on three pillars, namely an accelerated implementation of economic reform, a comprehensive review of government spending and a regulatory review to reduce the administrative burden on businesses.
The responsibility to implement Operation Vulindlela, a bold plan adopted by the previous administration to grow the economy, has become a hot potato. This plan is the brainchild of the president and is driven largely by the presidency.
The DA argued that it will only pass the budget if its deputy minister of finance is delegated specific powers to run Operation Vulindlela. The other contentious issue was the role of its deputy minister in the regulatory review to ease the administrative burden on business.
The approach of the DA in being an opposition party while being part of government is not going to disappear. It is unlikely to withdraw from the GNU unless it is pushed out. The power play as it approaches its conference next year will determine its participation in the GNU.
*Kekana is a member of the ANC’s national executive committee and part of the party’s GNU negotiating team
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