The South African soldiers being evacuated from their Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) mission have had to rely on the military equivalent of Uber. Perhaps Bolt would be more appropriate, given that their expedition ended in chaotic failure.
The South African Air Force (SAAF) no longer has proper airlift capacity for troops and equipment. Last Friday, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) had to borrow (and doubtless pay for) an Air Tanzania Boeing 787. As defence & military veterans minister Angie Motshekga rather quaintly put it: “If we had our own capability, we would have just picked up our children and landed them at the airbase.”
The event was all the more humiliating when it became farce. The soldiers were due to land in Bloemfontein, where Motshekga and senior officers were duly assembled to welcome them home. Instead, because the Tanzanian 787 was too big, it had to be diverted to Waterkloof air force base.
Even if the SAAF still had a fleet of old C130 Hercules transport planes, the C130’s range with a maximum payload was about 2,100km, far short of the 2,725km that separates Pretoria from Goma, where our troops were fighting in the DRC. That’s greater than the distance between London and Moscow.
Whatever we thought we were doing in the DRC, it wasn’t a success.
There has been acknowledgment of the bravery of our soldiers, but sharp criticism of the SANDF’s logistical incompetence and lack of appropriate medical support. In terms of the fighting they were expected to do, our soldiers seem to have been too lightly armed and equipped. In particular, they had no artillery and were expected to go into action without air cover — a “criminal” expectation by commanders, according to one military expert.
All this should come as no surprise. Defence spending as a proportion of South Africa’s GDP decreased from more than 4% in 1989 to less than 2% by 1996. By 2015, it was down to about 1.2%. In 2024, it was about 0.7%, significantly lower than the international norm of 2%.
It is getting worse. In the withdrawn February national budget, defence & state security was to get R60.7bn for 2025/2026, rising in two years to R65.2bn. That would have translated into average annual growth of 4.3% over the medium-term framework, roughly in line with expected inflation — in other words, marking time.
However, in Budget 3.0 in May, the 2025/2026 number dropped to R59.6bn, projected to rise to R61.8bn in 2027/2028. That is growth of just 1.2%. In real terms, the SANDF has been getting less and less money — as has been the case for most of this century.
The result is a largely broken military. The SAAF and South African Navy are barely operational, with only a handful of ships and aircraft and no money to train personnel. The army is unfit for purpose and old. In September 2020, then defence minister Nosiviwe Mapisa‑Nqakula admitted that the average age of our full-time infantry soldiers was 38 — at least a decade older than international practice.
Personnel costs now eat up close to two-thirds of the budget, whereas the global guideline is roughly one-third to personnel, one-third to training and exercises, and one-third to capital spending. The SANDF’s core purpose has become welfare rather than warfare.
As Roy Andersen, former JSE president and CEO of Liberty Life, and a retired SANDF Reserve Force major-general, has said: “It is concerning that South Africa’s defence strategy is set by Treasury officials who can’t possibly have a full understanding of the risks and threats we face.”
There is absolutely no evidence of a strategic approach, which amounts to a dereliction of their constitutional duty by the president and his cabinet.
Would you like to comment on this article?
Sign up (it's quick and free) or sign in now.
Please read our Comment Policy before commenting.