The withdrawal of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has highlighted South Africa’s declining capabilities in supporting peacekeeping operations.
Peacekeeping has been a priority for South African foreign policy since the late 1990s, premised on the idea its prosperity depends on a secure and peaceful Africa. It began in 1998 with the SADC intervention in Lesotho. In 1999, it joined a UN mission in the DRC, to which it still contributes.
South Africa has participated in about 16 peacekeeping and enforcement missions, with troops in Burundi, Comoros, the DRC, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mozambique and Sudan. Most were undertaken in the early 2000s, with the sole South African National Defence Force (SANDF) deployment to the DRC as part of a UN peacekeeping mission since 2015, apart from the SADC mission in Mozambique from 2021 to 2024.
South Africa’s contributions to peace enforcement missions in Mozambique and the DRC (also comprising troops from Malawi and Tanzania), have been criticised for being ill-planned and underresourced. Peace enforcement missions are more complex and challenging than peacekeeping missions, requiring larger weapons, better equipment and robust logistics, including air support.
The budget cuts over the past 15 years have drastically affected the SANDF’s ability to carry out missions. The decision by the summit of SADC regional heads on March 13 2025 to end the DRC mission came as no surprise after the fall of the towns of Goma and Sake to rebels.
Bram Verelst, a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, says the DRC mission was a “failure” because it did not meet its objectives. He says the deployment occurred under challenging circumstances. He notes a lack of co-ordination with the East African community regional force withdrawal, which allowed the M23 rebels to regain territory.
Verelst also suggests DRC strategy was flawed, relying on a past victory against a different iteration of M23. He emphasises the increased Rwandan involvement, including sophisticated weaponry, and the Congolese army’s reliance on diverse forces that made co-ordination difficult and exposed the DRC mission to “Rwandan propaganda of being part of a hostile coalition”.
In addition to these difficulties, Verelst points out Rwanda’s overt opposition to the DRC mission, even lobbying the AU and UN against it.
Military analyst Helmoed Heitman offers a contrasting view of recent SADC missions. He says though the Mozambique deployment achieved “temporary tactical success”, its impact was limited by an insufficient troop size and lack of air support, preventing any long-term effect. He describes the DRC mission “as complete a failure as one can envision”.
Heitman says: “The SADC force was supposed to neutralise M23 and other armed groups, but was instead neutralised by M23. Its presence achieved nothing.” He attributes this to the deployment of only about half the planned 5,000 troops and the absence of air support. He says even the planned SADC force numbers were insufficient.
We do not have any regional capability any more and our credibility is in shreds
— Helmoed Heitman
He draws a parallel to the Battle of Bangui in 2013, where South African paratroopers in the Central African Republic faced overwhelming forces without adequate support, noting that unlike then, South Africa no longer possesses the capability for a follow-on deployment.
Heitman says a post-Bangui decision led to deploying the Rooivalk attack helicopter to the UN mission in the DRC, but “now [with the SADC mission] we seem to have no operational combat aircraft, but deployed anyway”.
While acknowledging that “our troops did well [in an] impossible situation”, Heitman says: “We do not have any regional capability any more and our credibility is in shreds.”
Darren Olivier of African Defence Review concurs that South Africa’s peacekeeping contributions have waned due to the SANDF’s declining capabilities and funding. He considers the recent failure of the DRC mission “to have the desired effect” — largely because of insufficient funding and a lack of supporting assets — as “a low point and a blow to South Africa and SADC’s credibility”.
Olivier contrasts this with South Africa’s more robust involvement in the 2000s, marked by significant transport helicopter and aircraft support and troops known for their proactive engagement.
Olivier says the underresourced DRC mission, despite its ambition, was “far too static and exposed”. He concludes that South Africa’s diminished military power has hampered regional mission success, reducing its influence and long-term deterrence. Reversal requires “at least a decade of sustained reform and higher budgets” to restore the SANDF’s capabilities and credibility.
South Africa still has troops deployed in the eastern DRC under the UN mission, scheduled to be withdrawn at the end of this year.
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