Opposition politics: a big logjam, going nowhere

South Africa was robbed of an opportunity for a vibrant opposition and a possible alternative government by the demise of the Congress of the People (COPE).

It almost seems a distant memory, but the events that followed one of South Africa’s major gatherings post-1994 had the potential to reshape the country’s political landscape. That gathering was the South African National Convention. Led by ANC dissidents and hosted at the Sandton Convention Centre in late October 2008, it saw thousands of people come together to discuss the future of the country.

The gathering followed shortly after the recall of former president Thabo Mbeki by the national executive committee elected during the ANC’s 52nd national conference in Polokwane, in December 2007.

The emergence of Jacob Zuma as president of the ANC in Polokwane had sent tremors through South Africa’s political landscape. All the red flags were raised, warning of the making of a raucous leadership that would derail good governance. Those who ignored them were those who chose self-interest and/or the ANC ahead of the interests of the country.

Zuma was never fit to ascend to the highest seat in government. However, some who are now campaigning against his MK Party, such as Tokyo Sexwale, were his greatest supporters and enforcers. Zuma was their useful tool for spiting their nemesis, Mbeki; Zuma’s rise was aided by the politics of spite rather than an alternative, grounded vision for society.

As the national convention ended that weekend in late 2008, it became clear that South Africa’s political landscape would never be the same. The stage was set for the launch of a political party — a potentially significant breakaway from the ANC. It would be bigger than the United Democratic Movement (UDM), which had broken away a little under 10 years earlier, in 1996.

On December 16 2008 COPE was launched with only four months left to campaign and contest the 2009 national and provincial elections. To great fanfare, the party attracted interest from all corners of the country, across a diverse range of people, sectors, and groups. It embodied the possibility of a party that could bridge race, class and gender divides. Young people who had decided to focus on building their careers instead of being politically involved found themselves being swayed into activism by the catchy slogan: “Your hope for change.”

At that time, the political landscape was less crowded. There were only about 26 parties on the national ballot (today there are 52). And COPE performed well for a party that had had only four months to campaign — particularly considering the festive season fell in between. The party received just over 1.3-million votes, earning it 30 seats in the National Assembly, and it had representation in all nine provincial legislatures, making it the third-largest political party. No new party, at its first showing, has achieved this feat since the 1994 election.

However, within a year the destructive tendencies of the ANC — factionalism, greed, conniving and the like — had teleported themselves to COPE, and the party began to crumble. Having disappointed the supporters and voters who took a wild chance on it, the party suffered severely at the 2014 polls. It was reduced to three seats in the National Assembly and became a one-seat party in just three provinces.

There is no opposition party that carries the captivating momentum that COPE did in 2009, when the ANC was far stronger than it is today

The story of COPE is important in understanding how the political landscape was deprived of an opportunity to see a compelling alternative to the ANC. The disappointment led many voters to become disillusioned and sceptical of new political parties. Voters are unforgiving when they’ve been taken for a ride.

In 2024, there is a far greater crisis confronting opposition politics in South Africa. The ANC is at its weakest since 1994: it has been plagued by corruption; it is failing to create jobs; it has been ravaged by factionalism; and in its attempts at “renewal” it has shed some rogue elements a little too late. Those rogue elements on the right side of the dominant faction have also remained protected.

Yet there is no decisive indicator that the ANC will lose electoral support at devastating rates at a national level.

There is no opposition party that carries the captivating momentum that COPE did in 2009, when the ANC was far stronger than it is today. None of the 31 political parties that will be contesting the national election for the first time looks set to disrupt the status quo as COPE did.

What has gone wrong?

The momentum of newness has, over time, been depleted. The electorate is sceptical and often accuses political actors of being significantly fragmented. Certainly there is an increasing number of parties — but that doesn’t seem to translate into an ability to capture disaffected and lapsed ANC voters. These voters often find it distasteful when parties focus on bashing the ANC rather than making a case for their cause.

Multiparty democracy is in action, but the ability to energise voters — either to turn them away from the ANC or to encourage nonvoters to turn out on election day — points to a crisis of opposition politics.

This is made worse by politicians who self-promote rather than find ways to co-operate and work together. In 2019, when Mmusi Maimane resigned as leader of the DA, followed by Herman Mashaba as the mayor of Joburg, many thought the duo would collaborate and work together. Maimane even attended Mashaba’s resignation press conference. The deal seemed set but, alas, nothing came of it; they went in separate directions. As a result, there are three new political parties in this election that are led by people who were once colleagues in the DA: ActionSA (Mashaba), Build One South Africa (Maimane) and Xiluva (Bongani Baloyi). Worse still, Xiluva is a breakaway from ActionSA.

This is a classic case of parties formed by people who seem unhappy to be led and want to be in charge of their small tents rather than belong to a big tent. The people who are likely to support these parties are those who are animated more by the personality and charisma of leaders than the offering of the party.

This, too, is the case with the latest breakaway of the ANC, the MK Party, which is currently led by Zuma. Those who follow it do so based on their attraction to Zuma and their disapproval of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership of the ANC. It has nothing to do with MK’s vision for society. MK seems set to hurt sizeable pockets of ANC support in KwaZulu-Natal and some smaller ones in Gauteng and Mpumalanga.

Coalition politics is a game of numbers and there is no scenario at play where the MPC can gain 50%+1

Given the weaknesses of the ANC, the DA attempted to game a pre-election coalition when its leader, John Steenhuisen, during his closing remarks of the party’s congress in April 2023, touted the idea of a “moonshot pact” to stop the “doomsday coalition” of the ANC and EFF. That idea has since evolved into the multiparty charter (MPC). It features 11 political parties, but only five stand a material chance of being elected to the National Assembly and various provincial legislatures.

This is the MPC’s first weakness: it lacks volume. Coalition politics is a game of numbers and there is no scenario at play where the MPC can gain 50%+1.

Instead, the MPC has hurt the prospects of a smaller party such as ActionSA: some voters see a vote for this party as an automatic donation of support for the DA. So those voters who may be disillusioned with the DA may as well stick with the DA or shop elsewhere entirely. In this sense, the MPC appears to have been more an attempt by the DA to neutralise its opponents than to genuinely offer an alternative for South Africans. If the intention were the latter, all the political parties in the MPC would have folded into a single umbrella party to contest the 2024 elections. Umbrella parties have succeeded in several countries in Africa.

Again, this is a case of leaders seeking to remain in their little tents to protect their positions rather than making the difficult decisions and accept being led. Effectively, the MPC is dead in the water.

In short, the proliferation of new political parties does not automatically indicate the strengthening of opposition politics. The need for change in South Africa is glaringly obvious. The continued fragmentation of opposition parties means the possibility of change is postponed. This will help the ANC to suffer losses, but not enough to displace it as a significant player in South African politics after the May 29 polls.

The only constant in this journey, from 2009 to 2024, is Zuma. The electorate is still stuck with him, this time as one who could cause the ANC to dip below 50% nationally. What a plot twist — and this is not fiction, but the lived political experience of South Africans.

* Mnguni is acting executive director at political think-tank the Rivonia Circle