Officially, the ANC has banned campaigning for its presidency. Unofficially, the skirmishes behind the scenes are already brutal, with Cyril Ramaphosa squaring off against President Jacob Zuma’s former wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Ramaphosa may look like a long shot right now, but this is more than a fight for the top position: it’s a proxy battle for the heart of an organisation that has been corrupted.
Succession battles have been won and lost in the ANC for more than a century. Today, leadership positions in the organisation are no longer about risking life and limb to serve the people but, rather, about access to the state for personal gain by politicians with dangerously powerful ambitions.
It has become, in Frantz Fanon’s description of Africa’s post-liberation elite, "an acquisitive, voracious and petty caste, dominated by a small-time racketeer mentality".
This is why the game has become so dirty and the rules so skewed.
In December, the ANC will elect its 13th president, in what is already shaping up to be among the most feverishly contested elective conferences it has faced.
It is a battle shaping up between two central candidates — SA’s deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, and former African Union chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.
Others are still putatively in the running: ANC chair Baleka Mbete, ANC treasurer-general Zweli Mkhize and Free State premier Ace Magashule are perhaps the most obvious outsider candidates, but their chances seem slim.
But as this succession battle hots up, the overarching question is: can Africa’s oldest liberation movement "self-correct"? Can it reverse the rotten narrative that has grabbed hold of the party as Jacob Zuma’s era ends?
Clearly, change is in the air.
Last year, ANC loyalists began to punish the party, as could be seen in its loss of Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay, and overall support plunged from 62% in 2014 to 55%.
An internal ANC report says many party structures have expressed a loss of faith in Zuma after the ANC’s poor electoral performance.
There are other signs of discontent: lobby group SaveSA was formed by dismayed ANC members, while veterans have publicly questioned the party’s trajectory.
From within the ANC, there was a discernible fight-back against "state capture", while certain national executive members and ministers, including Derek Hanekom, stood up to oppose Zuma. A year ago, that would have been unthinkable.
Yet, while the need seems obvious, there is strong resistance to reform of both the party’s membership system and its style.
"Our movement is in trouble," declares Mcebisi Jonas, the deputy finance minister, writing in his personal capacity in the African Communist.
"Muddling along as before will see us defeated in Gauteng in 2019, and possibly out of power by 2024. The starting point of reform ... is agreement on what we need to change and not simply who we need to change, as is the commonly held view both in the media and among our comrades."
Jonas talks of the need for a "new narrative" which includes restoring the integrity of the ANC and the state, economic inclusion and macroeconomic stability.
This is the backdrop to the often opaque manoeuvring to succeed Zuma.
Ramaphosa is positioning himself as the next leader, based on a platform of ANC tradition and principle, by which the deputy president almost automatically steps up.
But Zuma and ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe have argued that there is no such tradition.
Instead, Zuma has effectively endorsed Dlamini-Zuma — extinguishing the argument that the deputy president should automatically succeed — by backing the idea that it’s time for a woman leader, in a single, aptly timed radio interview.
Analysts say Zuma would prefer Dlamini-Zuma as his successor as their views are more in accord. Also, the
likelihood of the corruption charges against Zuma being prosecuted under a Dlamini-Zuma presidency are seen as more remote.
But while Dlamini-Zuma is understood to be a frequent visitor to Nkandla, not all of Zuma’s backers — among them the influential Gupta family — are entirely comfortable with her.
The heat is rising, which explains why, despite a ban on lobbying, more ANC insiders are speaking out in support of their preferred candidates. Last week, former KwaZulu Natal premier Senzo Mchunu came out in support of Ramaphosa, saying the ANC needed to "change direction". Mchunu was predictably blasted for being an "attention seeker", but he was unrepentant.
This week, EFF leader Julius Malema weighed in, saying Ramaphosa stood no chance because "Dlamini-Zuma will
be president if Zuma wants
her to be".
But Ramaphosa’s backers believe his chances will be boosted by divisions among Dlamini-Zuma’s supporters, and they also feel she is tainted by Zuma’s touch.
The dark horse in the race is Mkhize.
Lobbyists for Ramaphosa, who are also senior ANC leaders, told the Financial Mail that the central message of his campaign will be this: clean governance and the proposition that this is the party’s last opportunity to elect a leader who will fix the system.
"Can the ANC self-correct? Not without a commander who will rescue this entire thing," said one leader on condition of anonymity. He cites the example of former ANC president Oliver Tambo, who pulled a divided party together at its Morogoro conference in 1969. "The system has been corrupted badly and it affects governance from municipalities upwards — especially state-owned entities," he says.
Another ANC insider is less optimistic, arguing that irrespective of the leadership core who take over in December, the party showed last year that it was beyond repair.
"If it was able to correct itself it would have done so after the constitutional court judgment on Nkandla or after the local election results, but it failed. It is paralysed."
A third ANC man, who is also a senior government official, says it would perhaps be easier for the party to self-correct were it to lose power and the "rats flee the ship".
So what are Ramaphosa’s chances?
In truth, pretty slim. Numerically, Zuma and his backers remain strong, so prevailing over Dlamini-Zuma will be a tough task.
And yet there are factors that could swing it Ramaphosa’s way between now and December 16, when ANC delegates gather in Gauteng to elect a new leader.
Ramaphosa’s choice of deputy will be key, says one influential lobbyist.
Mkhize has been touted as a possibility for Ramaphosa’s deputy — but many are sceptical.
Still, Mkhize would be a shrewd choice: he enjoys considerable support in KwaZulu Natal, which is also Dlamini-Zuma’s home base, and so could bite into her support. It is also understood that Mkhize has been active in the Amathole region of the Eastern Cape and is popular in the region.
But Ramaphosa’s backers distrust Mkhize, claiming he was responsible for "stitching up" the KwaZulu Natal provincial conference to ensure that current chairman Sihle Zikalala defeated Mchunu, who is now on Ramaphosa’s slate as a contender for secretary-general.
It is also understood that those backing Ramaphosa are considering a female deputy president. Remarkably, they have apparently even made overtures to Dlamini-Zuma. Others being touted include National Executive Committee (NEC) members Naledi Pandor and Thoko Didiza for possible deputies on Ramaphosa’s ticket.
A matter which has helped his campaign, albeit in a small way, is the removal (through suspension) of the Zuma-aligned ANC Western Cape chairman Marius Fransman — at least until the provincial general council in April, when a new leader will be elected.
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There are other critical elective conferences which will influence the mood. For a start, there’s the Eastern Cape provincial ANC indaba in June, and a fight in Limpopo by Zuma backers against Ramaphosa-aligned chairman Stan Mathabatha.
Any division in either Ramaphosa’s or Dlamini-Zuma’s group now could sway the race, too. This is why any possible return of former president Kgalema Motlanthe, while hailed by one Ramaphosa lobbyist, was criticised by another as it has the potential to divide the current deputy’s support.
Division in the dominant faction in the party is also evident — which could benefit Ramaphosa. Neither the ANC Women’s League nor the ANC Youth League is wholly united behind Dlamini-Zuma (see next story).
The "Premier League" support is also up in the air. This bloc of ANC leaders, from North West, Mpumalanga, the Free State and KwaZulu Natal, have traditionally been aligned to Zuma. But the North West and the Free State leaders are said to be unsure about Dlamini-Zuma, while Mpumalanga and KwaZulu Natal top brass are behind her. However, the divisions within this group are said to be more about who should be Dlamini-Zuma’s deputy, as two of the figures in the group are eyeing the post.
And then, of course, there’s corruption.
A possible revival of the 783 counts of fraud and corruption against Zuma, as well as the challenge to Thuli Madonsela’s state capture report, could further dent the ANC’s image. If these again spark calls for Zuma to step down before his successor is announced, it could be fatal for Dlamini-Zuma’s chances.
The dark horse in the race is Mkhize. He is understood to have shunned overtures by the ANC Youth League in KwaZulu Natal, who are backing Dlamini-Zuma — a move which culminated in Zuma’s dramatic unannounced arrival at and hijacking of a provincial party event which Mkhize was billed to headline last Sunday.
Mbete fancies her chances too. At one stage she was a contender to become the party’s first female president, but was unceremoniously dumped by the Women’s League in favour of Dlamini-Zuma this month.
While Mbete is evidently scrambling to keep her name in the ring, her argument — that it’s time for a woman president — effectively hands the prize to Dlamini-Zuma.
Another outlier is party policy chief and minister in the presidency Jeff Radebe, who some see as a possible "third way" candidate.
Finally, much will depend on the fairness of the internal processes to elect the leadership, which has been under scrutiny most recently at the party’s national general council (NGC) in 2015 and during its introspection process following the 2016 local elections.
Central in this debate is whether presidential candidates should be allowed to raise their hand to announce their candidacy.
The ANC’s guiding document for elections — written in 2001 and titled "Through the Eye of the Needle" — forbids "campaigning for oneself". So paranoid is the party that its NEC has even put a lid on structures naming possible successors to Zuma. Instead, it urges the party faithful to respect the role of the branches in leadership selection and to allow the organisation to first grapple with the "principles" or the type of leader it requires.
Mantashe is adamant that "Through the Eye of the Needle" remains relevant. He warns those arguing in favour of
US-style primaries that such a process produced "a Trump" in that country. He says it’s a "false debate" because every system produces faulty leaders from time to time.
"Through the Eye of the Needle tells us that the objective is to elect a leadership collective that is relevant to the challenges and tasks of the time — that is a subject for discussion. For example, you talk of the primaries, they produce a Trump, so we must not fetishise systems from other countries."
Political analyst Aubrey Matshiqi says many ANC leaders have benefited from the closed process for a variety of reasons. One could be that they would not cut it in an open process, for lack of charisma or because of a shaky grasp of policy. Equally, transparency would not necessarily suit a candidate whose lobbyists use money to "buy members".
"A closed process raises the appetite for political intrigue to win political battles," Matshiqi says.
Yet as the race hots up, the ANC’s ban on discussing names has already been defied by the Women’s League and, in a roundabout way, by Zuma himself, when he said the ANC was ready for a female leader (in other words: please elect my ex-wife).
And, while the NGC agreed in 2015 that it would be a disciplinary offence to form lobby groups and promote slates, no action has been taken against the "Premier League", says the SA Communist Party, an ANC ally.
Solly Mapaila, the SACP second deputy general secretary, says this faction is so blatant it even has a name — yet national leaders don’t condemn it. This is a departure from ANC tradition of "revolutionary discipline and morality", which will prevent the ANC from self-correcting and of restoring the trust of its supporters, he says.
There is another suggestion: a hybrid in which branches nominate candidates (as happens now), but the branches send their nominations directly to a central elections committee to avoid gate-keeping by upper structures such as regions and provinces.
While the ANC says the branches remain the "basic unit" of the party for electing leaders, it admits to corruption in this process: not only have parallel branches been set up ahead of a conference, but vote-buying, gate-keeping and slate politics have handed the power to factions and lobby groups.
Matshiqi argues the deeper problem is that the ANC centre — not necessarily its elective process — is not holding.
"When those who are custodians of the centre are responsible for its demise, they then create alternative centres or factions. This is a dual problem where the custodians of the centre (its top leaders) inadvertently destroyed the centre," he says.
ANC Northern Cape secretary Zamani Saul, who has researched factionalism and renewal of the party, says though there is "capacity" for self-correction it has been "eroded by the quality of leaders and members" in the ANC. To Saul, the quality of leaders is a critical element of self-correction, which would fail if it did not start with senior leaders.
"The fight against corruption makes sense to ordinary Chinese because the Chinese Communist Party’s battle against corruption started with rooting out corruption among the senior leadership," he says. The Chinese describe this as rooting out corruption among the "tigers and the flies" — senior party leaders and ordinary members.
The SACP’s Mapaila does not see such a commitment. He says the party often just speaks about dealing with these negative factors but never acts on it.
Motlanthe put it more bluntly in 2015, when he explained why he turned down a position on the party’s NEC after losing the race for the presidency in 2012.
"I know the constitution of the ANC and my sense was ... I can’t serve in an organisation that does not respect its constitution. So to be honest, I knew that I really did not want to be part of that leadership. If I continued serving in that leadership it would be a constant battle just to get them to operate on the basis of the constitution," he said.
Jonas, in the African Communist, writes that to restore the integrity of the ANC and the state, there must be an "immediate expunging of parasitic elements from the state, restoring confidence in the governance of state-owned entities, defending our democratic institutions and addressing concerns about the integrity of our policing, prosecutions and criminal justice machinery.
"These actions are necessary to both build the confidence of the electorate for 2019 and beyond and to restore investor confidence in SA." As deputy finance minister (despite swirling rumours of his axing in a cabinet reshuffle), Jonas knows all too well how crucial this is.
The candidates, too, are aware of these imperatives but are too busy arranging their own chess pieces to tackle these existential issues.
Yet, the deeper question, of whether the ANC can self-correct, remains unanswered.
Matshiqi doubts the party, in the thick of a divisive leadership race, can manage such a process before 2019.
"It is like asking a three-legged elephant to run like a four-legged lion," he quips.
In other words, don’t hold your breath.
What it means: The party will struggle to ‘fix itself’ before the ANC conference at the end of this year, or even before the national poll in 2019.
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