Why SA is no failed state

South Africa’s economic future is looking decidedly bleak, with the most bearish of commentators pointing to a looming debt crisis, crumbling governance, social unrest and state failure. Political analysts, however, seem less pessimistic.

Any economic turnaround hinges on politics. And, while the economic situation is deeply concerning, things aren’t looking too good on the politics front either.

In the largest cities, for example, there’s a changing of the guard every few months. Service delivery has hit the skids and communities are taking on municipal responsibilities as political parties squabble in council chambers.

At national level, there are worrying signs that the criminal justice system has collapsed. Take the escape of rapist and murderer Thabo Bester — it’s left the government with egg on its face and rendered our prison system a laughing stock. Meanwhile, criminal cartels eat away at key state institutions such as Eskom and Transnet, driving crises in the power and logistics sectors. Even mining is held hostage by criminal gangs that want quick access to the pie. 

While the crisis of criminality is most loudly lamented by the well-heeled, it is the poor who bear the real brunt of lawlessness. Yet police minister Bheki Cele remains in his post. National police commissioner Fannie Masemola — himself accused of receiving expensive luggage as a bribe — continues to steer the often amateurish police service. President Cyril Ramaphosa appears weak and ineffective, hampered by his inability to take difficult decisions — and take them fast. 

The system works; our political democracy is working

—  Steven Friedman

For all the rot, however, South Africa is no failed state, say political analysts.

“The reason people here latch on to the failed state thing is that it feeds into their anxiety that, to put it bluntly, if you put black people in charge it will end badly.” That’s the view of Prof Steven Friedman, director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of Johannesburg and Rhodes University.

“This is decidedly false. It doesn’t mean we don’t have huge problems, but to start calling South Africa a failed state is to miss the point entirely.”

Political and financial analyst Nic Borain suggests South Africa pulled back from the brink of state failure when Jacob Zuma was removed from the presidential office. 

“During that time, we seemed to be killing the goose that laid the golden egg,” says Borain. “We have seen patronage, arrogance and failed cadre deployment playing … out for a long time. The state capture thing … where the president was guided by organised crime which infiltrated institutions … during that period there was certainly a willingness to risk everything for the advancement of a few people.” 

But, he adds, the ANC was on that downward path in any case, and Zuma merely hastened the slide by destroying institutions that had the capacity and capability to curb it. 

Friedman says the definition of a failed state is a mirage, a US creation in the post-Iraq War era that’s used to describe countries which disregard the interests of the superpower. 

“If any of those now placing South Africa in the category of countries such as Somalia or Yemen were told in 1994 that South Africa would in 2023 have a functioning democracy — [one] in which we have a free media, functioning, independent courts and a governing party heading for opposition benches in this election or the next, yet it is training its leaders in working in opposition instead of clamping down on the media and opposition — they would not have believed it,” he says. 

“The system works; our political democracy is working.”

Wits School of Governance director Mzukisi Qobo says the narrative of state failure masks South Africa’s real problems, making them seem intractable.

“South Africa is far from being a failed state and is unlikely to become one in the next decade,” he says.

There has never been a long-term strategy for the EFF except a reverse takeover of the ANC

—  Nic Borain

But set aside the picture of the country as a basket case. What can we expect politically in the short and medium term — in 2024 and beyond? And what of the fears driving some of the talk of state failure, of a governing “doomsday” coalition between the ANC and EFF that will set the country on the road to complete collapse? 

Qobo is tempered when it comes to the ANC’s prospects in next year’s national election, saying it is unlikely to slip below 50%. “I think the ANC will remain in the low 50s. We do tend to overestimate the electoral shifts in South Africa,” he says.

This would be a relatively positive outcome, leading to some stability in government rather than a messy ruling coalition.

“The low 50s may be needed as a wake-up call for the ANC to take seriously the task of rebuilding institutions and to understand the electoral benefit of doing this in the long run,” says Qobo.

Still, he believes the ANC’s “shelf life” is much closer to expiry than we might think. “Will [the party] depoliticise the state, get rid of cadre deployment, reach beyond the party pool to get talent fit for purpose and take seriously the task of revitalising public institutions?”

Doing so would certainly mix things up. But whether the ANC has the moral backbone to make such changes “is a different story”, he says. 

Borain links the ANC’s prospects with the government’s ability to curb load-shedding. He has run the numbers and believes there is a possibility that by August 2024 (a likely month for the poll after the Electoral Amendment Act was signed into law this week), South Africa may have completely shed the darkness.

Nonetheless, he sees the ANC falling into the 40s, then possibly tying up with the IFP. It’s a possibility Friedman also doesn’t rule out, even if the IFP appears politically closer to the DA. 

Says Borain: “This does not exclude the [ANC’s] loss of KwaZulu-Natal or the loss of Gauteng, and obviously the Western Cape, in the provincial election.”

It may be something of a thumb-suck, but he believes this scenario is more realistic than an ANC-EFF tie-up. “Should the ANC get 40% and the only way back is with the EFF, I think it will be an extremely challenging time for the ANC.

“The EFF is not a growth party, it is a radical voice which will not do anything more than seek patronage, and its support will grind to a halt somewhere around 10%. There has never been a long-term strategy for the EFF except a reverse takeover of the ANC.”

It’s an important point, given the EFF’s behaviour inside and outside parliament, and something the ANC is acutely aware of.

If anything, Borain says a coalition between the two parties could end up splitting the ANC down the middle. It would probably create such a huge rift, he says, that “there’s a possibility that a cataclysmic split takes place. That could split all other parties. It would roll through our political economy and reorientate everyone into a new system, which in a way is needed in our politics.” 

Already the possibility of the ANC in Gauteng working with the EFF is causing deep discomfort in party structures. Many, for example, are asking why the provincial leadership is cosying up to a party that stormed the stage when Ramaphosa was delivering his state of the nation address in February.

It’s for this reason that Friedman believes an agreement with the EFF is unlikely as long as Ramaphosa is at the helm of the ANC. And he is unlikely to go anywhere — certainly not at the behest of an opposition party.

What of a Paul Mashatile presidency? Some analysts say Mashatile is more open to working with the EFF and would even offer leader Julius Malema the deputy presidency. But the FM understands Mashatile is as wary of an EFF tie-up as other senior ANC leaders.

Besides, says Friedman, “when has Malema agreed to be deputy of anything?”

As he sees it, the EFF is only interested in co-operation with the ANC where that will bring about the governing party’s destruction. He points, for example, to the ANC asking the EFF to join its parliamentary vote on land expropriation without compensation — a cardinal EFF policy. Not only did the EFF refuse, it said it wouldn’t vote unless the ANC agreed to abolish private property entirely.

The salient point is that the EFF is prepared to set aside the chance to realise one of its primary policies if that means pushing the ANC to its limits — and, eventually, out of power. 

Even if the ANC and EFF were to co-operate, Friedman doesn’t see this lasting more than a few months; the fledgling party would make demands the ANC would simply not be able to agree to. 

“The idea of a deputy president Malema obediently working for a president Mashatile for five years would mean a total policy and perspective shift [from the EFF],” he says.

What’s more likely is that the ANC wins just enough support to retain power at national level, or slips below 50% but stays in charge with the backing of one or two smaller parties. 

Opposition leaders don’t trust one another, they do not have sufficient capacity or maturity to enter into a pact that transcends narrow party interests

—  Mzukisi Qobo

South Africa is on a political hiatus. A weak opposition landscape means alternatives to ANC rule are hard to come by. Despite its governance track record, the DA’s policy stance — and the years in which the ANC has cast it as a “white party that will bring back apartheid” — rule it out as an option for most black voters. 

Party leader John Steenhuisen’s “moonshot pact” is taking shape, he said on Saturday, with a host of parties agreeing to co-operate to prevent the “doomsday pact”. But analysts say the moonshot is dead in the water.

“The moonshot pact would be a shot into the abyss and would not lift South Africa out of its malaise. Opposition leaders don’t trust one another, they do not have sufficient capacity or maturity to enter into a pact that transcends narrow party interests,” says Qobo.

“My sense is that we have to be aware that things are going to get worse before they get better. But we do have the elements to activate a new direction for change. It won’t happen on its own and will have a series of false starts, but in one or two elections, including 2024, with the continued maturing of the voting public, we may see the emergence of credible leaders both from inside and outside the ANC.” 

In other words, expect small steps forward and large steps back before the rebuilding can truly begin.

Borain sees green shoots, such as the work done by Operation Vulindlela — a joint project between the National Treasury and the presidency targeting structural reforms to kick-start the economy. The fruits of the work are likely to become more visible by 2025, he says. 

Should the ANC remain in power beyond 2024, its next leader will be crucial to its performance in 2029. Mashatile appears to be the only player on the board for now, but Ramaphosa’s backers are determined to see one of their own take over.

The FM understands a potential contender for deputy president, or even the top job, could be secretary-general Fikile Mbalula, considered the ANC’s secret weapon ahead of next year’s polls. 

If anyone can pull the ANC back from the electoral brink, it’s Mbalula, whose organising and mobilising skills are unmatched in the organisation, say national executive committee leaders. His position as the organisation’s CEO has effectively placed him in a strategic role, and it is understood he is hard at work laying the groundwork for an ANC campaign unlike any seen before. 

While other contenders for the top job are likely to emerge, the issue of succession may become less relevant if the party proves incapable of stepping up its governance game and staffing state institutions with competent, capable leaders — and loses its grip on power as a result. 

Political analysts consider an ANC-EFF governing coalition to be highly unlikely. Any possible tie-up could split the ANC down the middle and see a new party emerge at the centre of the political spectrum

—  What it means:

Borain, speaking as analyst and patriot, says while an ANC-EFF alliance is far-fetched, a split in the ANC would allow a party to emerge at the centre on the political spectrum — potentially led by Ramaphosa. 

“That might be a fairytale but I do think it’s possible,” he says. “It’s far better than the ANC getting a low percentage and coming up against a DA-led alliance … it could be disastrous, a combination of Italy and Israel. We cannot afford that. We have urgent national tasks needing a strong government.”

Increased stability, in Friedman’s view, requires an updated electoral law that gives parties more time to hammer out durable coalitions that set party interests aside.

It’s a view echoed by Mining Indaba advisory council chair Frans Baleni, who has spent his political life in the congress movement. He says parties have to begin thinking more about the country, elevating nation-building over their particular agendas.

“It’s more about parties fighting among themselves,” he tells the FM. “But it’s time to set aside that myopic view. We have to reach the point where we all realise the ship is sinking and we have to save it. It is unsustainable to have so many people unemployed, unserviced and falling victim to crime. We have to put aside our differences and say all hands on deck.”

Baleni says the ANC has to read the signs from voters and renew itself. A failure to do so will result in the country falling into a long period of uncertainty, with weak alliances winning power in each election cycle. At that point, as things fall apart, the party will be judged harshly for its lack of accountability and action. 

In the end, when South Africans in a distant future turn back the pages of history to 2024, two themes will emerge: the urgent need to act and the inevitable consequence of inaction. That’s the stark choice facing the ANC as it lurches towards polls marking the 30th anniversary of democracy.