The primary problems SA faces are so acute that the necessary solutions — self-evident in nature — cross ideological divides. Could it be that one of the bizarre consequences of the ANC’s ruinous governance, at some point in the future, will be a grand consensus on how to resolve the crisis? If it is, the party’s elective conference would seem to be key in determining how close such an eventuality actually is.
Jacob Zuma’s disastrous presidency has divided as much as it has unified. The implications for the ANC and its relationship with its alliance partners have been catastrophic. The party itself is fundamentally and violently divided; likewise, its alliance partners — the SACP and Cosatu — are creaking under the weight of factionalism. But key role players across the board do seem united about certain overarching problems — things like "state capture", the state of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the dire condition of the economy, and corruption and mismanagement.
Zuma’s disastrous presidency may have laid the foundations for a grand, nonpartisan consensus
On on these issues and a few others, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish the views of those inside the alliance from those of the opposition. The problems are so profound that it is only those with a vested interest in them — one that turns more on personal benefit than any ideological or policy belief — that defend them. But for those outside Zuma’s personal patronage network, such is the moral depravity on display that they have been forced to be blunt and forthright, or risk their own integrity.
Thus, we live in an age of great truth telling. Those who would normally obfuscate or evade when hegemonic control and unity would allow, have found themselves speaking truth to power. Crisis has that effect — it generates contradiction.
So, many bound by past judgments are now straining to dissociate themselves from a situation they effectively created. Hypocrisy is no less ubiquitous.
The thing is, when one agrees with the sentiment "Zuma must go", it is not enough to simply offer that up as a standalone position. One must justify it. And this has required those inside the alliance to produce evidence in support of their call. As there is no shortage of evidence — most of which is overwhelming — we now have a situation where, across party divides, a range of people are all singing from the same song sheet. And the more evidence they provide, the more they are bound together.
Eskom, credit ratings, unemployment, the SABC, cadre deployment, the National Prosecuting Authority, political assassinations, SA Airways ... all of these issues, and many others besides, are so intrinsically problematic there can be no real debate about what is required to fix them.
Regarding SOEs, for example, the base problem is so fundamental that long before any debate can be had about complexities, such as what their roles are and how they should be structured, they all first require the simple appointment of qualified people who can manage money and deliver on a programme.
Ironically, the next ANC president is going to have to adopt the exact same attitude the DA does when it takes over an ANC administration: spending five years clearing out the rot, re-establishing basic systems and protocols, making good appointments, and ensuring the machine delivers on its most basic requirements. Only then is it possible to start to fashion and reshape the actual nature of that government.
Two possible paths lead away from the ANC’s December elective conference. If someone is elected who has fashioned him or herself as a cure for the Zuma disease — Cyril Ramaphosa or Zweli Mkhize, for example — the immediate post-conference agenda will thus be common cause. On all the problems identified above, the elected leader will have to produce a clear and unambiguous programme of action. He or she could literally identify a list of top 10 priorities and almost everyone, of any political affiliation, would be in broad agreement.
If someone is elected who has fashioned him or herself as a continuation of Zuma and all he represents — Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for example — then, obviously, none of this applies. There might be some ostensible consensus on the problems, but without any reformation of the ANC’s internal culture — without a clearing of house — the party and alliance will simply continue to divide and splinter.
A personality like Ramaphosa, a man who has framed himself as a great negotiator and mediator in the Nelson Mandela mould, could well use this chaotic consensus to his advantage. There is a scenario in which he seeks not just to reunite the alliance but to bind the opposition to his programme.
It is a possibility made easier when it comes to the likes of the DA, because the gap between its policy programme — certainly on the economy — and that of the ANC has narrowed.
There is a general consensus on all the biggest issues. From social welfare grants (which the DA has promised to double spend on), to the National Development Plan (which the DA has wholeheartedly endorsed), to key institutions like treasury, the SA Revenue Service, the Reserve Bank and the Public Investment Corp (the independence of which the DA wants re-established) and SOEs (where, it is true the DA does want some
privatisation but, primarily, it wants good governance and delivery), there is little to separate the likes of Ramaphosa from the DA.
Unintentionally, Zuma has made good governance a universal concern. Sheer destruction has rendered ideology irrelevant
If one were really to play devil’s advocate, there is even a scenario, admittedly remote, whereby Ramaphosa approaches the DA to formally work together with the ANC, possibly asking party leader Mmusi Maimane to join the cabinet. If he were to evoke the greater SA good in doing so, it would be an offer that would buy him some considerable political capital as a nonpartisan unifier who is willing to put the country first — a call the DA has made its own. And, while it may never accept, it would certainly put the DA on the back foot.
But all of this assumes a great deal — least of all that, should Ramaphosa win, he does so convincingly enough to be able to enact any such programme of action in the first place. If he just scrapes through, he will be heavily bound by the informal party network he inherits from Zuma and without a strong-enough mandate to undo it.
Likewise, it assumes Ramaphosa is astute enough to realise that, in the long term, the ANC must reform and modernise. It might just be that he believes himself a strong enough mediator to carefully balance the old and the new without offending anyone.
You get the sense, however, this would intensify, not counter, the internal decay. But Ramaphosa is, if anything, more inclined to compromise than lead.
Whichever way you look at it — and as counterintuitive as it is — at no point in democratic SA’s history, have such a diverse range of parties and personalities agreed on so much. That fact has been somewhat lost in the fray. But it is a political reality. Unintentionally, Zuma has made good governance a universal concern. Sheer destruction has rendered ideology irrelevant.
Whether anyone inside the ANC can garner enough support to capitalise on this remains to be seen.
But there is a rare political opportunity out there that someone, with the right personality and conviction, could exploit to his or her advantage.
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