Finance minister Enoch Godongwana delivered the 2026 budget speech on February 25 with the stated aim of advancing “inclusive growth”. It also confirmed a familiar reality: defence remains a low fiscal priority.
The department of defence will receive R59.3bn, up from R57.1bn last year. Once inflation is considered, the increase amounts to a real cut of about 5% — a familiar pattern in the 21st century. The announcement came days after President Cyril Ramaphosa told soldiers at Armed Forces Day in Thohoyandou that more resources would be directed to the military.
The budget suggests otherwise.
South Africa’s defence spending fell below 1% of GDP in 2017 and has since declined to about 0.7%. That is the lowest share of national output since the declaration of a republic in 1960. It also places South Africa far below most comparable states. Global military spending averages roughly 2.5% of GDP. Nato members are moving towards 5%. Even in Africa the contrast is striking. Algeria spends roughly 9% of GDP on defence, about $21.8bn. Nigeria allocated about $3.3bn to defence and security in 2025. South Africa’s budget amounts to roughly $2.8bn.
Against this backdrop, raising defence spending to around 1.5% of GDP would represent a significant improvement. It would double the resources available to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), easing the most acute operational pressures. Maintenance backlogs could begin to shrink, aircraft and ships could return to service and training cycles could recover.
Yet even such an increase would not resolve the structural problems facing the SANDF. Without a clear strategy linking missions, capabilities and funding, additional money risks merely slowing the decline rather than reversing it.
For most of the past decade the SANDF’s budget has been distributed according to institutional structure rather than strategic priorities. National Treasury programmes divide funding broadly between landward defence (the army), air defence (the air force), maritime defence (the navy) and military health support. The proportions have changed little over time.
The army consistently receives the largest share. Between 2015 and 2025, roughly one-third of the defence budget went to landward defence. The explanation lies largely in manpower. Border safeguarding operations and peacekeeping missions require large numbers of troops. In a defence establishment where salaries consume most of the spending, labour-heavy formations inevitably dominate the budget.
The air force receives a smaller but stable allocation, usually about 12%-13% of total SANDF spending. On paper it operates one of Africa’s more sophisticated fleets, including Gripen fighters and Rooivalk attack helicopters. In practice, operational activity has declined sharply as maintenance and operating funds have tightened.
Flying hours illustrate the problem. In the mid-2010s the air force managed roughly 10,000-12,000 flying hours annually across its fleet, broadly in line with planning requirements for pilot proficiency. By the 2023/2024 financial year, this had fallen to about 6,900 hours. Spares shortages, maintenance delays and constrained operating budgets have grounded large portions of its aircraft.
The navy’s share is smaller still, typically around 8%-9% of defence spending. Yet its operational responsibilities are extensive. South Africa’s naval force structure centres on four frigates and three submarines acquired in the late 1990s. Maintaining them has proved costly, while the budget available to sustain them has steadily eroded.
Operational activity has fallen accordingly. Earlier naval planning envisaged roughly 22,000 sea hours annually as the level required to sustain a balanced fleet. Budget pressures forced this target down to around 8,000 hours. Even that has proved hard to achieve. In the 2023/2024 financial year the navy recorded about 2,600 sea hours.
South African Navy chief Rear Admiral Monde Lobese has been scathing about the underfunding of maritime capability. In November he complained that “we are required to produce annual performance plans and defence reviews, one after another, and what saddens me is knowing very well that this requirement is just a mind game as these will not be resourced. We need to think about what is at stake for not having a navy present at sea.”
The result is a force that is manpower-heavy but resource-poor
The funding trend reveals a widening gap between nominal capability and operational reality. South Africa still has advanced aircraft and warships, yet the number of hours they operate continues to decline. Budget allocations increasingly sustain personnel and institutional structures rather than operational output.
Personnel costs are central to this imbalance. The SANDF employs about 68,700 uniformed personnel and about 12,000 civilians. Salaries, benefits and pensions account for around 62% of the defence budget (the international benchmark is around 40%). Once these costs are covered, relatively little remains for maintenance, operations and modernisation.
The result is a force that is manpower-heavy but resource-poor. Ships remain in harbour because maintenance contracts cannot be funded. Aircraft are grounded for lack of spares. Training exercises are curtailed to conserve fuel and preserve ageing equipment. The SANDF risks becoming a body that pays people to maintain, in theory, a force structure it cannot afford to operate.
Demographics add to the challenge. The average age of SANDF personnel is now about 39, significantly higher than that expected in a force designed for physically demanding operational roles. Younger recruits struggle to enter the system while older soldiers remain in service because the department cannot afford large-scale exit packages.
As long as 20 years ago, the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute warned that the SANDF risked becoming an organisation dedicated to welfare rather than warfare, with too many soldiers who were old, fat and sick. Little has happened to disprove the prophecy.
Defence expert Helmoed-Römer Heitman says there is no easy route to reducing personnel costs. “Assuming we still intend to participate in peacekeeping in the future, the army is short some 10,000 warm bodies. Cutting every possible post elsewhere will not fill that hole. The only way to effect a real cut in the cost of employment [CoE] would be to change the SANDF’s mission, to drop either border and internal tasks or any peacekeeping capability.
“If you look at other armed forces, you will find that the only ones that get close to a low CoE percentage are those with lavish budgets or conscription.”
The military skills development system brings young recruits into the armed forces for a two-year training cycle before some of them are absorbed into the regular force or reserves. In theory, it allows the military to rejuvenate its ranks while maintaining a trained reserve pool.
In practice the programme has struggled. Limited budgets mean only a small number of recruits can be retained each year. Many trained soldiers leave after their contracts expire because the SANDF cannot afford to keep them. At the same time, older personnel remain in posts because retirement incentives are unfunded.
Raising defence spending to around 1.5% of GDP would help stabilise the system. It would provide breathing room for the SANDF after years of austerity. Maintenance contracts could be restored, aircraft and ships could return to service and training cycles could recover to levels needed to maintain basic proficiency.
Such an increase would not transform the force overnight, but it would slow the erosion of capability and prevent further deterioration in operational readiness.
Even more important is strategy, something the SANDF has lacked for decades. Without a clear vision of what the SANDF is meant to do and how it should be structured to do it, additional resources risk being absorbed by the existing system. Personnel costs will continue to dominate spending, legacy force structures will persist and operational capability will remain constrained. Money without strategy would prolong the current model rather than replace it.
Defence policy cannot be divorced from the broader strategic environment. Middle powers across the world are rearming, sea lanes are becoming battlefields and everything else is uncertain. Economic security increasingly depends on the ability to protect trade routes, maritime infrastructure, resources and national interests.
Unless funding rises significantly above current levels and is matched by clear strategic reform, the defence force will not merely weaken. It will gradually collapse under the weight of its existing structure and budget — with profound negative implications for national security and the economy itself.
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