The SANDF: A Ratel stuck in a ditch?

Out on the desolate plains of the Northern Cape, about halfway between Upington and Kimberley, lies the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF’s) Combat Training Centre Lohatla. At 158,000ha, it is one of the world’s largest combat training areas and the largest in the southern hemisphere. For decades, the South African Army has trained here, where diesel meets dust and the army flexes its muscles.

This year’s Exercise Vuk’uhlome 4 was, on the surface, another routine Lohatla drill. Yet it unfolded at a time when the SANDF is in a perilous situation, politically and militarily.

After the Second Battle of Goma in January, South African troops were forced to withdraw from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Before that, they had been confined to base under a negotiated ceasefire that resembled a surrender, the first such instance for South African forces since World War 2.

Against this backdrop, on Friday December 5 SANDF chief of joint operations Lt Gen Siphiwe Sangweni appeared before the joint standing committee on defence to brief MPs on an upcoming rotation back to the DRC under Operation Mistral, the SANDF’s long-running contribution to the UN mission in the DRC, active since 1998.

The standing committee had requested an advance briefing on the Mistral rotation. However, the presentation by Sangweni “contained less usable information than a tourist brochure”, according to Carl Niehaus, the EFF representative on the committee.

“No troop numbers beyond vague ‘reductions’,” writes Niehaus, “no equipment lists, no force-protection assurances, no lessons learnt, no financial breakdown, no mission objectives — nothing that would allow members to fulfil their constitutional duty to assess operational readiness. Six slides. A six-slide middle finger to parliament.”

Back at Lohatla, the army was determined to prove, in the SANDF’s major exercise for the year, that it is combat-effective. Army chief Lt Gen Lawrence Mbatha was under pressure and pushed his formations to deliver.

101 Field Workshop, the unit responsible for maintaining and repairing the army’s prime mission equipment, showcased the refurbishment of hundreds of armoured vehicles, trailers and trucks, many of which had not run in years. Ahead of the exercise, at least 100 Ratel infantry fighting vehicles had been restored, along with dozens of Casspir armoured personnel carriers (APCs).

On the parade ground at Mount Huxley, where defence minister Angie Motshekga (who was more than two hours late) and distinguished visitors gathered, Mbatha unveiled a “new concept”, the rapid deployment brigade. Formerly known as the mechanised modern brigade, it includes about 6,000 personnel, with another 3,000 participating in the exercise.

This brigade is intended to be the core of the army’s conventional fighting ability, tasked with national defence and deterrence. It is made up of mechanised infantry on Ratels, motorised infantry on Casspirs and light infantry on Mamba APCs. These are supported by armour in the form of Olifant tanks; Rooikat armoured fighting vehicles; artillery consisting of G5 and G6 howitzers; Bateleur multiple-launch rocket systems; and engineering, medical and logistics elements.

On paper, this is a substantial force and on parade it certainly looked the part. But the term “modern” is misleading. In 2026, the Ratel will have been in service for 50 years, the Casspir for more than 45 years. The artillery pieces date from the mid-1980s. The average age of personnel is 39, far too high for an operational formation.

The small number of aircraft on show indicated the parlous state of the South African Air Force

Demonstrating the capability of the force required very expensive use of ammunition. It was an awe-inspiring display of firepower. Every kind of calibre was fired, from 5.56mm rifle rounds to 155mm artillery shells, including potentially the last of the 127mm rocket stockpile. (It remains to be seen if there is the budget to replace what was fired off.)

Tanks charged across the plains, throwing up dust before turning hard to engage the “enemy”, represented by targets standing in for a fictional group trying to liberate the Northern Cape. Artillery then struck the “enemy’s rear” where reinforcements were said to be gathering on a distant hill. Mechanised infantry followed, firing 20mm cannons and 12.7mm machine guns as they advanced. While the army displayed all the elements of a combined arms unit, it was unable to co-ordinate them properly into a true combined manoeuvre.

There were impressive moments. An Oryx helicopter conducted a combat casualty evacuation. Pathfinders, the SANDF’s elite reconnaissance and airborne specialists, executed free-fall jumps.

One crater charge, intended to create an anti-tank obstacle, misfired when the blasting cap failed. Engineers spent 20 minutes rerigging the device before detonating it without much warning, sending a shockwave and dust cloud across the spectators.

Throughout the demonstration, a “surprise” was repeatedly promised. However, after a demonstration of an aerial resupply drop, which had not been showcased for years, the exercise ended somewhat abruptly.

Only later did we learn what the intended surprise was: an airborne insertion of 64 paratroopers from the South African Air Force’s only operable C-130 transport aircraft. Members of the media had observed the practice runs the day before, but the jump was cancelled. Rumours circulated of several injuries from hard landings during rehearsals.

There were reports that on the evening before the demonstration, Mbatha had summoned formation commanders and voiced frustration at what he viewed as an inadequate performance during the build-up, yet glitches persisted.

The airborne jump did not take place. The planned bomb drops by Hawk Mk120s were cancelled after a Ratel got stuck in a ditch on the range, eating into the short time window that the Hawks had on station. With limited fuel, they completed a flypast and returned to Air Force Base Makhado in Limpopo.

The army deserves credit for assembling an impressive display, albeit in the main by restoring old equipment to use. The massive G5 and G6 guns, world leaders when first deployed with a range of up to 40km, have recently been upgraded with modern digital fire-control systems. They are easy to use and remain very accurate.

A notable demonstration was that of Denel’s new T5-52 truck-based howitzer. The army has placed an order for six but is waiting on Denel to deliver. The demonstration occurred about 30m in front of the gathered viewers and guests, specifically the ambassador of Iraq. Strong interest has been shown in the T5-52 by Iraq, which has inquired about purchasing up to 100 to upgrade its artillery capability. If such a sale goes through, it will be a momentous achievement for Denel, South Africa’s state-owned developer of military technology and equipment, and could open the door for future orders.

However, the small number of aircraft on show indicated the parlous state of the South African Air Force: a Casa 212 light aircraft for the supply drop, two Oryx helicopters (still in UN livery), two Gripen fighter jets for a flypast and three Hawks with bombs.

It must be asked what the relevance of brigade training in the arid Northern Cape can be to continuing operations in the DRC, where terrain and climate, along with the scale and nature of South Africa’s expected contribution, are completely different.

Some observations from the Lohatla exercise point to deeper issues. Troops lacked basic protective gear. Few helmets were visible, body armour was absent, and hearing protection was inconsistent. Vehicle reliability was alarming. Beyond the Ratel that got stuck, several vehicles stalled along the route to Mount Huxley, including the Casspir transporting members of the media.

The army has arguably done the best it can with ageing and obsolete equipment, and without other meaningful training opportunities, because of budget cuts.

Despite the term “rapid deployment”, the SANDF does not have the aircraft to execute that. While new radios have been purchased, there are too few of them to be of practical use. In the Lohatla exercises, communication between vehicles was through human runners.

There clearly is not the communications capacity for combined arms operations or logistics for anything above battalion level. Food for the soldiers at Lohatla seemed to consist entirely of dry rations (“ratpacks”), with the army’s capacity to provide proper field kitchens long gone. The absence of air and logistics support was a key factor in the earlier disaster in the DRC.

The army appears to be walking into another DRC rotation, despite not being genuinely combat-ready and lacking the capacity to sustain another year-long deployment very far away from home.